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Abstract—Transparency is crucial to ensuring fair, honest
elections. Transparency is achieved by making information (e.g.
election result) public. In e-voting literature, this publication is
often described in terms of a bulletin board. While privacy of
voting systems has been actively studied in recent years, resulting
in various analysis frameworks, to date there has not been an
explicit modelling of bulletin board in any such framework.
Privacy implications of bulletin boards are thus understudied.
In this paper, we extend the semantics of the framework of
Jonker, Mauw and Pang to model a bulletin board and capture
coercion-resistance. The usage of the extended framework is
illustrated by an application to the Preˆt a` Voter voting system.
Moreover, we present an information-theoretical measure of
privacy loss in elections.
I. INTRODUCTION
A prime requirement for election systems is to ensure voters
have reason to trust the result of an election. Correctness alone
cannot achieve this – a correctly functioning process need not
inspire trust. Transparency of the voting process is the key
to foster such trust. In evoting literature (e.g. [1]–[5]), such
transparency is often achieved by making election information
(such as the final result) public via a so-called bulletin board.
Similarly, privacy is of paramount importance for fair and
honest elections. Without voter-privacy, a malicious agent can
threaten or bribe voters, and find out whether or not they
complied with his bidding. Such threats undermine the very
purpose of voting. There exist several notions of privacy-
type properties in voting. Vote privacy is the property that
an outside observer cannot determine how a voter voted.
Although this seems sufficient to ensure privacy, Benaloh and
Tuinstra [6] introduce receipt-freeness, which expresses that
a voter cannot gain any information to prove to an intruder
that she voted in a certain way. Receipt-freeness aims to
prevent vote buying, even when a voter chooses to renounce
her privacy. Another stronger notion of privacy is coercion-
resistance [7], stating that a voter cannot cooperate with the
intruder to prove how she voted.
Many voting systems have been proposed claiming to
satisfy certain privacy properties [1]–[4], [7], [8]. A uniform
approach is necessary to consistently evaluate such claims.
Various frameworks have been proposed to this end (e.g. [9]–
[12]). For instance, Delaune, Kremer and Ryan [11] formalise
vote-privacy, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance using
observational equivalences of processes. Backes, Hrit¸cu and
Maffei [10] use the same framework to have a more precise
modelling of coercion-resistance and focus on remote elec-
tronic voting protocols. The quantitative framework by Jonker,
Mauw and Pang [12] combine knowledge reasoning along the
lines of [9] and trace equivalences of [10], [11] to formally
model voting protocols and define vote-privacy and receipt-
freeness for the voters. It can precisely measure privacy for
voters by establishing choice groups. However, to this date, an
explicit modelling of a bulletin board and its effects on voter’s
privacy has not been studied.
Contribution and paper organisation. In this paper, we first
shortly discuss the usage of bulletin boards in voting and the
setting of our work (Sect. II). Our main contribution is to
extend the work by Jonker, Mauw and Pang [12] to account
for bulletin boards, focusing on the syntax and semantics
extensions (Sect. III and Sect. IV). We formalise privacy
notions, in particular, we show how to formalise coercion-
resistance in the framework in a natural way. In addition,
we introduce and formalise a new privacy notion: forced vote
spoiling (Sect. V). These extensions make the framework more
complete and expressive for modelling and analysing existing
voting systems. To illustrate the usage of our definitions, we
apply the enhanced framework to the Preˆt a` Voter voting
system by Ryan [4] (Sect. VI). Furthermore, we discuss an
information-theoretical measure of privacy loss in elections
by a few examples (Sect. VII) and conclude the paper with
some future research directions (Sect. VIII).
II. BULLETIN BOARDS AND OUR SETTING
In e-voting literature, bulletin boards are used in any in-
stance where public access to information is desired. Examples
include publishing information from the election authorities,
e.g. non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs [13], and announc-
ing the final result. Furthermore, in some systems, the voter
is expected to publish information. For example, in [3], the
voter’s vote is publicly announced. Thus, both voters and
election authorities should be able to add information to the
bulletin board, as well as obtain information from the bulletin
board.
In line with the privacy framework of Jonker, Mauw and
Pang [12], we aim to capture the effects of a bulletin board
at the level of interactions between agents, not its internal
workings. The original framework considers three different
types of communication channels: public, (sender) anonymous,
and untappable. Thus, to add information to the bulletin board,
we assume that any of the same types of channels may be
used. This means that any publication sent over a public or
anonymous channel can be blocked by the intruder. In addition
to these three channels, sometimes the assumption is used
that election officials can post directly to the bulletin board.
For such direct connection, we introduce an unblockable send.
Finally, we assume that the bulletin board is public, that is,
information on the bulletin board may be read by any party
as soon as the bulletin board has received the information.
We model the contents of a bulletin board as a list of terms,
using function list2set to convert lists to sets. A list is denoted
as L = (a1, a2, . . .). Appending an to the end of list L is
denoted as L′ = (L, an). Interaction with the bulletin board
is modelled as regular interaction with an agent, though we
purposfully omit an agent specification of the bulletin board.
Note that this modelling of a bulletin board also implies no
security guarantees on the part of the bulletin board (e.g., the
board does not sign its contents), and its communications are
subject to the intruder’s whim (as per the standard Dolev-
Yao intruder).Any desired security properties will have to arise
from how the bulletin board is used, thus ensuring that this
model does not introduce security where there is none.
The intruder is modelled as a standard Dolev-Yao in-
truder,who has full control of the public network (note that
untappable channels are not under his control).
III. SYNTAX OF THE FRAMEWORK
In this section, we recall the framework [12] and extend it
to account for interaction with bulletin boards. Changes wrt.
the original framework are marked in boldface.
We use V to denote the set of voters, who make a choice
of their preferred candidate γ(v) ∈ C. Similarly, Aut denotes
the set of authorities. The terms communicated in a voting
protocol are built up from variables in Vars , candidates in C,
random numbers in Nonces , and cryptographic keys in Keys ,
ranged over by var, c, n, k, respectively. The class Terms of
terms, ranged over by ϕ, is given by the BNF
ϕ ::= var | c | n | k | (ϕ1, ϕ2) | {ϕ}k.
Terms may be paired ((ϕ1, ϕ2)) or encrypted with a key
({ϕ}k). The set of variables of a term ϕ is given by fv(ϕ).
Terms encrypted with k can be decrypted using the inverse
key k-1. For symmetric encryption, k-1 = k, whereas in
asymmetric encryption, pk(a), sk(a) denote the public and
secret key of agent a, respectively. Signing is denoted as
encryption with the secret key.
Variables represent unspecified terms. An example is the
voter’s choice: it is represented by variable vc until instanti-
ated. Variables are instantiated by substitution. The substitu-
tion of var by ϕ is denoted as var 7→ ϕ, the application of a
substitution σ to a term ϕ as σ(ϕ).
A term ϕ may be derived from a set of terms T (notation
T ⊢ ϕ) if it can be derived by repeatedly applying the
following rules:
ϕ ∈ T =⇒ T ⊢ ϕ
T ⊢ ϕ1, T ⊢ ϕ2 =⇒ T ⊢ (ϕ1, ϕ2)
T ⊢ (ϕ1, ϕ2) =⇒ T ⊢ ϕ1
T ⊢ (ϕ1, ϕ2) =⇒ T ⊢ ϕ2
T ⊢ ϕ1, T ⊢ k =⇒ T ⊢ {ϕ1}k
T ⊢ {ϕ1}k, T ⊢ k
-1 =⇒ T ⊢ ϕ1
An agent’s knowledge K is a set of terms closed under
derivability. This is defined as K = {ϕ | K ⊢ ϕ}.
Terms are communicated between agents or send to/read
from the bulletin board. These communications may
occur over public, anonymous, untappable, or unblockable
channels.1 The class of communication events Ev is given by:
Ev = { s(a, a′, ϕ), r(a, a′, ϕ), as(a, a′, ϕ), ar(a′, ϕ), ph(i),
us(a, a′, ϕ), ur(a, a′, ϕ),ubs(a, a′, ϕ), ipub(ϕ)
| a, a′ ∈ Ag ∪ {BB}, ϕ ∈ Terms , i ∈ N },
where s, r, as , ar , us , ur denote sending and receiving over
public, anonymous and untappable channels, respectively,
ubs denotes sending over an unblockable channel, and ph(i)
denotes an agent ready to start phase i. Finally, ipub denotes
the intruder adding a term to the bulletin board.
The behaviour of an agent is determined by the order
in which events occur. This order is defined by the agent’s
process. The class Procs of processes, ranged over by P , is
given by the BNF
P ::= δ | ev .P | P1 + P2 |
P1 ⊳ ϕa = ϕb ⊲ P2 | ev .X(ϕa, . . . , ϕn).
Here, δ denotes a deadlock, ev .P denotes action prefix,
P1 + P2 non-deterministic choice, and P1 ⊳ ϕa = ϕb ⊲ P2
conditional choice (behaving as P1 if ϕa is syntactically equal
to ϕb, otherwise as P2). Finally, we have guarded recursion.
We assume a class of process variables, which is ranged over
by X . For every process variable X with arity n, there is
a defining equation of the form X(var1, . . . , varn) = P ,
with the syntactic requirement that the free variables of P
are precisely var1, . . . , varn. Without loss of generality, we
assume a naming convention such that all free variables in the
defining equation of a process variable are globally unique,
thus limiting their scope to that defining equation. Substitution
is extended to events and processes in the obvious manner.
A voting system specifies for each agent the agent’s state.
The state of an agent a is a tuple of its knowledge knwa (a
set of terms) and its behaviour (i.e. the order in which events
are executed) as determined by its process Pa.
Definition 1 (voting system [12]): The class of voting sys-
tems VotProt is of type Ag → (P(Terms)×Procs). A voting
system VS may be instantiated with voter choices, as given
by choice function γ : V → C. This instantiation is denoted
as VSγ , which, for each voter, substitutes the voter choice
variable vc by the choice specified by γ in her process.
VSγ(a) =
{




Here, πi denotes an extraction function that extracts the ith
component from a tuple, and µ = vc 7→ γ(a)).
1The distinction between these channels will become clear in Sect. IV.
IV. FORMAL SEMANTICS
In this section, we highlight the extensions to the formal
semantics of the framework. The operational semantics is de-
fined in two layers. First, the semantics of an individual agent
is defined in a context with an intruder with knowledge KI
and a bulletin board BB. Based on these semantics, we define
the semantics of a voting system. The operational semantics of
a voting system can be seen as the parallel composition of all
agents. For the agent semantics, we present only a subset of
the semantic rules. Given these, the remaining semantic rules
can be easily adapted from the original framework.
A. Agent semantics
The semantics of agents describes the effect of the events
on the agent state. Recall that agent state is defined as a tuple
containing a knowledge set and a process. Furthermore, we
consider the agent in context with the intruder and the bulletin
board. Hence, for agent semantics we consider transitions of
states of the form: (KI ,BB, knwa, Pa), representing intruder
knowledge, the bulletin board’s contents, and the agent’s state,
respectively. Intruder knowledge is represented by a set of
terms, the bulletin board by a list of terms, and the agent state
by a tuple of agent knowledge knwa and agent process Pa.
In the assumed intruder model, each tappable communica-
tion by an agent is a communication with the intruder. Hence,
the semantic rules below take the intruder’s knowledge into
account. The states considered below thus consist of a tuple
of intruder knowledge KI and agent state.
There are some restrictions on the terms that may occur in
an event. A term ϕ occurring in a send event must be closed
(fv(ϕ) = ∅) at the moment of sending.
1) publish: An agent may try to publish a closed term ϕ if
and only if the agent can derive ϕ from his own knowledge.
This is denoted as a send to the bulletin board BB. For a public
publication s(a,BB, ϕ), the semantics rule is as follows.
knwa ⊢ ϕ fv(ϕ) = ∅
(KI ,BB, knwa, s(a,BB, ϕ).Pa)
s(a,BB,ϕ)
−−−−−−→
(KI ∪ {ϕ},BB, knwa, Pa)
The rule for anonymous publication as(a,BB, ϕ) is similar:
these terms also end up in the hands of the intruder (albeit
without revealing the sender). Terms are added to the bulletin
board by the intruder using ipub(ϕ) (see system semantics),
as public and anonymous channels are under the intruder’s
control. In case of an untappable publication, the intruder
has less control: he cannot stop the publication, but he will
(immediately) become aware of it (as the bulletin board is
public). The difference with an unblockable send is that the
intruder cannot identify the sender of an untappable message
only from the communication event.2 Untappable publications
are modelled as follows:
knwa ⊢ ϕ fv(ϕ) = ∅
(KI ,BB, knwa, us(a,BB, ϕ).Pa)
us(a,BB,ϕ)
−−−−−−−→
(KI ∪ {ϕ}, (BB, ϕ), knwa, Pa)
2Intruder observations are captured at the system semantics level.
Unblockable publications are modelled analoguous, using the
ubs(a,BB, ϕ) action.
2) read: An agent can try to read the bulletin board. If
successful, this extends his knowledge with the full contents
of the bulletin board. Reading may be done anonymously or
untappably, if the bulletin board supports such channels.
(KI ,BB, knwa, r(a,BB, var).Pa)
r(a,BB,list2set(BB))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(KI ,BB, knwa ∪ list2set(BB), Pa)
To capture the flavour of how process flow rules are updated
with respect to the original framework, below we provide the
semantic rule for guarded recursion.
3) guarded recursion: An invocation of process variable X
with argument list ϕ1, . . . , ϕn can be executed by agent a if
the corresponding process P in the defining equation of X
can execute, under the specified arguments.
σ = var1 7→ ϕ1 ◦ · · · ◦ varn 7→ ϕn
X(var1, . . . , varn) = P fv(ϕ1) = . . . = fv(ϕn) = ∅
(KI ,BB, knwa, σ(P ))
ev
−→ (K ′I ,BB
′, knw ′a, P
′)
(KI ,BB, knwa, X(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn))
ev
−→ (K ′I ,BB
′, knw ′a, P
′)
B. System semantics
The formalisation of the semantics at the system level
remains largely unchanged with respect to the original frame-
work. Nevertheless, as the core modelling of the bulletin board
is at the level of the system semantics, we present the full
system semantics. The main difference at this level is the
addition of the intruder publishing event. To express this, we
introduce the state of a voting system.
Definition 2 (voting system state): The state of a voting
system is a tuple of intruder knowledge, a bulletin board
(which is a list of terms) and a mapping of agents to agent
states (a voting system), as follows.
State = P(Terms)× Terms⋆ × VotProt .
The knowledge and current process for each agent are given
by VotProt . We denote the attribution of state (knwa, Pa)
to agent a as a : (knwa, Pa). The current state of agent a in
system state (KI ,BB, S) is denoted as a : (knwa, Pa) ∈ S.
The initial state of voting system VS with respect to choice
function γ is (K0I , ε,VS
γ), for initial intruder knowledge K0I
and the empty list ε.
The operational semantics of voting systems describe how
the state of a voting system changes due to the interactions
of its agents. The state of a voting system is given by the
intruder knowledge and the state of each agent. Typically, the
initial intruder knowledge contains public keys of all agents,
compromised keys etc.
The operational semantics of voting systems in the context
of a Dolev-Yao intruder (limited to public and anonymous
channels) is given below. The semantic rules give rise to
a labelled transition system (LTS), with labels denoting
the events. Untappable communication is modelled as
synchronous communication, hence the us and ur events are
replaced by uc events (denoting untappable communication)
in the set of labels Labels of the transition system: Labels =
{uc(a, a′, ϕ) | a, a′ ∈ Ag ∪ {BB} ∧ ϕ ∈ Terms} ∪ Ev \
{us(a, a′, ϕ), ur(a, a′, ϕ) | a, a′ ∈ Ag∪{BB} ∧ ϕ ∈ Terms}.
Both untappable communications and phase synchronisation
are synchronous events by more than one agent. The other
events are executed without synchronising with other agents.
We distinguish the non-synchronous events as Evnsync , which
is defined as follows.
Evnsync = { s(a, a
′, ϕ), r(a, a′, ϕ), as(, a′, ϕ), ar(a′, ϕ)
| a, a′ ∈ Ag ∪ {BB}, ϕ ∈ Terms}.
The below system semantics uses the agent semantics to define
the dynamic behaviour of the system. The rules may involve
agents a, b ∈ Ag , which we omit from the premises of
the rules. Note that the premise of the rules involves agent
state transitions (a three-tuple of intruder knowledge, agent
knowledge and agent process), and may specify restrictions
on the system state (a mapping of agents to agent states).
1) non-synchronous events: The operational semantics for
any ev ∈ Evnsync , including reading the bulletin board, is
analoguous to the original framework.
(KI ,BB, knwa, P )
ev
−→ (K ′I ,BB
′, knw ′a, P
′)





′, {a : (knw ′a, P
′)} ∪ S \ {a : (knwa, P )})
2) untappable communications: Untappable communica-
tions between agents a, b where b 6= BB are modelled as
synchronous communications between a and b.
(KI ,BB, knwa, Pa)
us(a,b,ϕ)
−−−−−−→ (KI ,BB, knwa, P
′
a)
(KI ,BB, knw b, Pb)
ur(a,b,ϕ)









(KI ,BB, {a : (knwa, P
′




b)} ∪ S \ s0)
3) publishing: In the case of public and anonymous chan-
nels, a term is added to the bulletin board directly by the
intruder (instead of agents), as follows.
KI ⊢ ϕ fv(ϕ) = ∅
(KI ,BB, S)
ipub(ϕ)
−−−−−→ (KI , (BB, ϕ), S)
In the case of an untappable send to the bulletin board, the
semantics rule is as follows.
a : (knwa, Pa) ∈ S
(KI ,BB, knwa, Pa)
us(a,BB,ϕ)








′, {a : (knwa, P
′
a)} ∪ S \ {a : (knwa, Pa)})
The case for an unblockable send is analoguous.
4) phase synchronisation: As in the original framework, a
phase transition can only be executed if all authorities are
ready for it. The phase transition is then executed by all
authorities and by all agents ready and willing to do so. Its
semantics rule is referred to the original framework [12].
The system semantics gives rise to an LTS for each voting
system. An execution of the system is a path in this LTS. A
path is represented by a sequence of labels and is called a trace.
The class of traces Tr consists of sequences of labels. The
traces of voting system VS instantiated with choice function
γ (denoted VSγ) are given by
Tr(VSγ) = {α ∈ Labels⋆ | α = α0 . . . αn−1 ∧




∀0 ≤ i < n : si
αi−→ si+1}
We denote the intruder knowledge and the bulletin board in
the last state of a trace t as KtI and BB
t
, respectively.
Traces model the dynamic behaviour of the system. The
next section determines the privacy of a given voter in a given
trace. This is then extended to establish the privacy of a voter
in a voting system.
C. Quantifying Voter-Privacy
The extended formal model developed above enables us to
express if an intruder can distinguish two executions of the
system. In comparison with the original framework, the only
difference is that some of the newly introduced labels are not
(completely) visible to the intruder. As before, these changes
have been marked in boldface.
The distinguishing ability of the intruder is formalised as
the intruder’s ability to reinterpret terms: two terms ϕa, ϕb
are indistinguishable to the intruder if the intruder may, given
his knowledge, reinterpret the one as the other and vice versa
(for precise definitions, see [12], [14]). This is captured by a
reinterpretation function ρ, used e.g. as ϕa = ρ(ϕb).
Some events in a trace are hidden from the intruder. In
particular, the intruder cannot see any communications over
untappable channels, nor the sender of an anonymous com-
munication. The observable part of a trace t is captured by
the function obs(t) (see [12]).
Definition 3 (trace indistinguishability): Traces t, t′ are in-
distinguishable for the intruder, notation t ∼ t′ iff there exists
a reinterpretation ρ such that the traces are equal under ρ, and
the final intruder knowledge as well as the final contents of
the bulletin board in both traces (denoted KtI ,BBt for trace t,
respectively) are equal under ρ as well. Thus, t ∼ t′ iff
obs(t) = ρ(obs(t′)) ∧KtI = ρ(K
t′




This is extended to distinguishing sets of traces as follows.
Definition 4 (choice group [12]): Given voting system VS ,
choice functions γ, γ′ are indistinguishable to the intruder,
notation γ ≃VS γ′ iff
∀t ∈ Tr(VSγ) : ∃t′ ∈ Tr(VSγ
′
) : t ∼ t′ ∧
∀t ∈ Tr(VSγ
′
) : ∃t′ ∈ Tr(VSγ) : t ∼ t′
The choice group for a voting system VS and a choice function
γ is given by cg(VS, γ) = {γ′ | γ ≃VS γ′}. The choice
group for a particular voter v, i.e. the set of candidates
indistinguishable from v’s chosen candidate, is given by
cgv(VS, γ) = {γ
′(v) | γ′ ∈ cg(VS, γ) }.
V. FORMALISING PRIVACY
A conspiring voter behaves differently from a regular voter,
as she will communicate with the intruder in certain circum-
stances. The original framework explored the ways in which
voters can conspire in depth. Here we only recall two options
that have a bearing on the case study. In each of these two
cases, the conspiring voter v shares all her knowledge with
the intruder (which can be expressed as s(v, I, knwv)). The
two cases are as follows:
1) v shares her knowledge at the end of the protocol,
2) v shares her knowledge at the beginning of the protocol.
In the first case, the last action of v is to share her knowledge,
while in the second case, it is her first action. In line with the
original framework, we write Θi(v,VS), i ∈ {1, 2} to denote
a voting system VS where voter v is a conspirator of type 1
or type 2. For voting system VS , and choice function γ, the
choice group of conspiring voter v with respect to different
conspiracy types i ∈ {1, 2}, is given by
cg iv(VS, γ) = {γ
′(v) | γ′ ∈ cg(∆i(v,VS), γ)}.
Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson [7] introduce the privacy-
related concept coercion-resistance. This extends beyond re-
ducing privacy of the vote. It includes receipt-freeness (which
is captured by the framework) as well as prevention of:
• forced abstention: the intruder prevents the voter from
voting.
• simulation attack: the voter gives her private keys to the
intruder, who votes in her stead.
• forced random voting: the intruder forces the voter to vote
for a random entry3 in a list of encrypted candidates.
These attacks can be captured in the framework as follows.
a) Forced abstention: Forced abstention is trivial if the
intruder has a full view of the network (the intruder knows who
participated). Hence, forced abstention only makes sense if the
intruder has incomplete knowledge of the communications.
Thus, any non-trivial case of forced abstention needs to
consider a set of voters whose interaction is not observed.
Correspondingly, we write OA ⊆ Ag for the set of observed
agents. This limited view (captured by ΠOA) constrains the
intruder’s ability to distinguish two traces. Now, two traces t
and t′ are constrained-view indistinguishable with respect to
OA (notation t ∼OA t′), if there exists a reinterpretation ρ
such that the observed traces are reinterpretable, and the final
content of the bulletin board is reinterpretable as well. Thus,
3The intruder does not need to know which candidate is chosen, as long
as it is a random choice. This attack forces a more uniform distribution of










′))) ∧ BBt = ρ(BBt
′
)
Here, ΠOA(t) is the trace derived from t which consists only
of actions by agents ∈ OA, i.e.:
ΠOA(ℓ · t) =
{
ℓ ·ΠOA(t) if ℓ ∈ EvOA
ΠOA(t) otherwise
where EvOA is the set of all events executed by agents ∈
OA with any communication partner. We write γ ≃OA
VS
γ′ for
choice function indistinguishability and cgOAv (VS, γ) for the
choice group of voter v in voting system VS based on the
above definition of trace indistinguisability t ∼OA t′. Note
that γ ≃Ag
VS
γ′ is equivalent to γ ≃VS γ′, and therefore cgAgv
is equivalent to cgv .
We express absence of forced abstention for a given set
of observed agents OA as follows: voter v cannot be forced
to abstain if her choice group contains, but is not limited
to, abstention. By denoting abstention as γ(v) = ⊥, this is
formalised as ⊥∈ cgOAv (VS, γ) ∧
∣∣cgOAv (VS, γ)∣∣ > 1.
b) Simulation attacks: In a simulation attack, the intruder
casts a vote himself. Simulation attacks are resisted if the
intruder cannot tell whether the vote he cast affects the result
or not. We extend the domain of γ to include the intruder I .
The extended set is referred to as VI . The intruder’s choice
group cgI then captures the intruder’s uncertainty about his
own vote. Using this, a system is simulation-attack-resistant if
the intruder cannot tell whether his vote is counted or not, i.e.
{⊥, γ(I )} ⊆ cgI (VS, γ).
c) Forced random voting: In forced random voting at-
tacks, the intruder forces the voter to vote randomly. This
means that whenever the voter process can make a choice,
either conditionally or non-deterministically, the intruder in-
structs the voter how to proceed. This can be expressed in
terms of the framework by rewriting every process P that
denotes a choice for a specific agent. Let ∆rnd be a process
transformation function for forcing a specific agent’s choices.
Then we have, for any process representing a choice (i.e. any
process P such that P = P1+P2 or P = P1⊳ϕa = ϕb ⊲P2),
∆rnd(v, P ) = r(I , v, var).∆rnd(v, P1)
⊳var = true ⊲ ∆rnd(v, P2),
where v is the agent forced, var is a fresh variable and true
is a constant term ∈ Terms . Using this, the choice group of
the voter can be determined as before.
A. Forced vote spoiling
In addition to coercion-resistance, we distinguish a new
privacy attack “forced vote spoiling”. Whereas in forced ab-
stention the intruder aims to force a voter not to communicate,
here the intruder aims to force the voter to produce an invalid
ballot. If the intruder cannot observe a voter at all times during
the elections, enforcing abstention may not be possible, but
requiring proof of an invalid vote may very well be. If a
system accepts invalid ballots and allows these to be made
public, this can be a devastating attack on voter privacy. We
express this by introducing ⊤ as an invalid ballot. If necessary,
various different invalid ways of filling in the ballot may be
expressed as ⊤,⊤′,⊤′′, . . .. Using this, a system resists forced
vote spoiling if the intruder cannot tell whether a voter voted
invalid or not, i.e. {⊤, γ(v)} ⊆ cgv(VS, γ).
VI. CASE STUDY: VOTER PRIVACY IN PREˆT A` VOTER
The Preˆt a` Voter (PaV) voting system [4] aims to combine
privacy and verifiability. A ballot in PaV has two columns:
a per-ballot randomized listing of the candidates on the left,
and space for a mark by the voter on the right. Below the
right column is an onion, a ciphertext which decrypts to the
left-hand side order of candidates.
After authenticating, the voter chooses a random envelope
containing a ballot and enters a voting booth, where she marks
her chosen candidate. Still inside the booth, she separates the
two columns of the ballot and destroys the left-hand column.
The right-hand column only contains the voter’s mark and the
onion, and is deposited in the ballot box. The voter receives
an official copy of the ballot as a receipt. After the election
is closed, the ballots are mixed using a mixnet, and then
(threshold) decrypted, after which the result is announced.
Privacy of PaV: Voter-privacy in PaV requires that the
order of candidates is only known to the voter, an assumption
which the case study will point out. PaV can defeat forced
random voting by allowing the voter to request new ballots
until the desired order is obtained [15]. Forced abstention and
simulation are handled by polling station procedures. Forced
vote spoiling is achieved by requiring the voter to return
with an official receipt of a spoilt ballot. This attack may be
defeated by disallowing invalid votes. However, this would
force all voters to cast valid votes.
A. Modelling Preˆt a` Voter
Fig. 1 offers a graphical representation of our PaV model,
in which phase transitions are denoted by dotted lines. First,
the voter authenticates herself and requests a random ballot
i by sending i signed. The registrar sends ballot i, which
contains a permutation πi and the corresponding onion (πi
encrypted for the counter). The voter selects her preferred
candidate γ(v), and sends the right-hand column (modelled
as a pair containing the index corresponding to her candidate,
πi(γ(v)), and the onion) to the registrar. The registrar returns
an authenticated copy to the voter.
After the voting closes, the registrar publishes all the
received votes. We assume the Registrar has an untappable
connection with the bulletin board (meaning that the intruder
cannot interfere with this). When this phase is finished, the
counter reads all ballots from the bulletin board, mixes them,
decrypts them and publishes the result. As this case study
focuses on privacy, not verifiability, we view this latter process
as merely sending the decrypted ballots to the bulletin board.
Note that the above model does not capture the provision
that the voter destroys the left column of the ballot. This









Fig. 1. Model of voter interaction in PaV
cannot be expressed in the framework and, in general, cannot
be assured technically. Therefore it must be ensured via
procedural means. Consequently, we expect to find that the
cryptographic measures of PaV by themselves are insufficient
to guarantee privacy in the analysis below, and thus we expect
the analysis will find a privacy risk.
B. Measuring privacy of PaV
We show that in any non-trivial setting,4 the choice group
size of any non-unanimous choice function > 1. This implies
that PaV does offer at least some privacy in non-trivial settings.
Lemma 1 (privacy of PaV): Suppose |V| > 1 and |C| > 1.
Then for any choice function γ1 such that there are voters
va, vb such that γ1(va) 6= γ1(vb), we have |cg(PaV , γ1)| > 1.
Lemma 2 (voter-controlled privacy of PaV): For any non-
trivial setting (i.e. |V| > 1, |C| > 1), the following holds:
1) PaV is not resistant against type 1 conspiring behaviour.
2) PaV is not resistant against type 2 conspiring behaviour.
To conserve space, we sketch a proof of the second lemma;
detailed proofs are available in [16].
Proof: (type 2 conspiracy) A process modelling type 2
conspiring behaviour begins with sending her knowledge to the
intruder (s(v, I, knwv)). Note that sk(v) ∈ knwv . Therefore,
the intruder can open the ballot as sent by the Registrar to
the voter ({πi, {πi}pk(C)}pk(v)). Therefore, the intruder knows
which candidate order πi the voter received. Consequently,
the intruder is then able to determine precisely how the voter
voted. The same reasoning holds for type 1 conspiracy (sharing
final knowledge).
While Lemma 1 shows that PaV offers some privacy, the
proof of Lemma 2 indicates that the permutation πi puts
privacy at risk. However, in PaV, the risk of exposing the
link between voter and πi is mitigated by procedural means
(shredding πi). This has an impact on adapting PaV for remote
voting, where the lack of a controlled environment means
that PaV cannot ensure that the candidate order cannot be
linked to a voter. One method to alleviate this is to prove the
order of the candidates to the voter using designated verifier
4A setting with more than one candidate and more than one voter.
proofs. To prevent any information leakage, such proofs should
be communicated over untappable channels. A voting system
along these lines, predating PaV, was described in [3].
VII. A PRIVACY MEASURE
The concept of choice group quantifies voter’s privacy, but is
too imprecise – it doesn’t account for distribution of votes. If a
voter’s choice group only contains one candidate who received
votes, that voter has no privacy, irrespective of the size of
the choice group. To address this issue, we propose a new
privacy measure using relative entropy. Our method quantifies
the amount of probabilistic privacy information revealed to the
intruder if a voter cooperates with him according to one of the
conspiring behaviour classes [12].
Definition 5 (Relative entropy [17]): Let θ, θ′ be two dis-
crete probability distributions on a set S. The relative entropy








Intuitively, the larger D is, the more information η′ leaks
compared to η. We assume a convention 0 log2 0 = 0, and
require that the domains of θ and θ′ are the same, i.e.,
dom(θ) = dom(θ′). In general, D(θ′, θ) 6= D(θ, θ′), so
relative entropy is not a true metric. It does satisfy several
important metric-properties, e.g., it is always non-negative, and
equals zero only if θ = θ′.
Our main idea is to measure how much information the
intruder can obtain after interacting with a compromised voter
during the election, together with the information he observes
from the election results published on the bulletin board. This
boils down to calculating the relative entropy based on the
published election results and the choice group computed for
a particular voter.
Example 1 (Dutch elections): Consider the results of the
2010 parliamentary elections in the Netherlands5. Suppose the
choice group of voter v only includes religious parties, in casu:
CDA, CU, SGP and EPN. If the distribution of votes η was
uniform over the whole elections, i.e. η(CDA) = . . . = 118 ,
then knowing the vote is for a religious candidate induces
a new distribution η′ such that for all non-religious parties
c, η′(c) = 0. The relative entropy is then D(η′, η) = 2.17.
However, votes were not uniformly distributed, but as fol-
lows. Total: 9, 416, 001; of which CDA: 1, 281, 886; CU:
305, 094; SGP: 163, 581 and EPN: 924. Using these numbers
for distribution η (i.e. η(party) = #votes for party9,416,001 ), we obtain
D(η′, η) = 4.75. Thus, while the choice group did not change,
the privacy loss more than doubled when the actual distribution
of votes was taken into account.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We extended the framework of [12] to account for informa-
tion made public via bulletin boards and to capture coercion-
resistance (somewhat similar to the approaches by Delaune et
5Available from http://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/
al. [11] and Backes et al. [10]). We illustrated applicability of
the extended framework by analysing Preˆt a` Voter. In addition,
we proposed relative entropy as a privacy measurement in
voting. We showed that combining choice group with election
result can cause a significant reduction in privacy, even when
some privacy remains. These ingredients together provide a
powerful analysis tool to evaluate privacy of voting systems.
For future directions, we are interested in further applica-
tions of information-theoretic analysis to privacy of voting
systems. This may, in particular, be used to investigate the ef-
fects of various counting methods and ballot forms on privacy
loss, such as the Italian attack (see e.g. [6]). Furthermore, the
framework can be extended to model conspiring authorities (an
extension from conspiring voters). Finally, we are interested
in modelling how a coalition of voters can execute a defensive
strategy against a coercer requesting specific behaviour.
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